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ABSTRACT
Theory of Mind Development and Executive Functioning
in Elementary School Children
By Dana Futoran

The following study explored the role of verbal ability and executive functioning in
theory of mind understanding in elementary school children. Scores on measures of
language comprehension, verbal ability (sentence memory, and forward digit span),
matrix completion, executive functioning (backward digit span), and second-order theory
of mind tasks were obtained. Partial correlations of the measures controlling for age
revealed verbal ability to be significantly correlated with theory of mind comprehension.
A regression analysis demonstrated that auditory language comprehension was the only
variable, in addition to age, that explained unique variance in performance on a recursive
thinking task. Possible explanations are explored and future directions are recommended.

Theory of Mind Development and Executive Functioning
in Elementary School Children

Children’s ability to describe, predict, and explain human behavior using internal
psychological states such as desires, beliefs, and intentions is referred to as a theory of
mind (Astington & Gopnik, 1988; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988). The majority of research
in this area has been done with preschoolers, when children acquire the understanding
that people can hold beliefs that are not in accordance with reality (“false beliefs”) (e.g.,
Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; Lewis & Osborne, 1990; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).
However, the development of knowledge in this domain most probably entails continuity
from the very beginnings of social interactions with caregivers in infancy to more
sophisticated and flexible use of mentalistic interpretations of behavior in later childhood.
Recently, it has been suggested that executive function deficits may be responsible for
constraining theory of mind development until typically developing children reach the
age of around four. The present study focuses on the relationship between theory of mind
and executive functioning in an elementary school population.
Theory of Mind
There have been various explanations concerning the origins of a theory of mind
(for a review see Moore, 1996). Some have emphasized the importance of the social
environment. For example, Russell (1992) and Tomasello (1995) argue that the
experience of social interaction provides opportunities for the child to see the outcomes
of his or her intentional behavior and the behavior of others. Better understanding of
false belief has been found to be related to the number of siblings in the family (Perner,
Ruffman, & Leekham, 1994), the amount of pretense play (e.g., Youngblade & Dunn,
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1995), the amount of talk about the causal relation between people’s beliefs and desires
and their behavior (Brown & Dunn, 1992; Dunn, 1995), and the quantity of mental verbs
used between mothers and children (Moore, Pure, & Furrow, 1990). The importance of
the child’s behavior in relation to the social environment has also been considered. For
example, “theory-theory” conceptualizations of theory of mind focus on how the child
uses his or her own mind as a model to actively generate and test hypotheses about the
intentional behavior of others, thus developing a naïve theory of the mind or a “folk”
psychology (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992).
The existence of an innate theory of mind module has also been postulated
(Baron-Cohen, 1993). For example, as part of a three-component theory of mind
mechanism, Leslie (1987) has posited that a “decoupling device” comes “on-line” at a
certain point in brain maturation. This device allows the child to separate what is
actually occurring from a representation of what is occurring, thereby enabling symbolic
activities like pretend play and false belief understanding (Perner, 1991; see also BaronCohen, 1988). This decoupling is said not to occur in the syndrome of autism (Roth &
Leslie, 1991).
Theory of Mind and Autism
It has been hypothesized that a lack in theory of mind is responsible for the deficit
in individuals with autism (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1989; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985;
Sigman, Arbell, & Dissanayake, 1995), providing some support for a biological or innate
basis for theory of mind development. Autism is a pervasive developmental disorder
characterized by impairments in social interaction, communication, and imaginative play
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Depending on the study, only 15% to 60% of

3

children with autism are capable of successfully passing standard false belief tasks
(Happé, 1995). Identifying differences between those who can pass the theory of mind
tasks from those who can not is critical in determining the set of component skills
necessary to develop the ability to explain our own and others’ behavior using mental
concepts. In the classic change in location false belief paradigm by Wimmer and Perner
(1983), the child observes “Maxi” put an object in location x and then, when Maxi leaves,
watches as the object is transferred from location x to location y. Since this transfer
comes as a surprise, the child has to assume that Maxi still believes that the object is in
location x. Children with autism generally respond like normally-developing children
under the age of four who have not acquired the appreciation that their thoughts may be
different from the doll’s beliefs (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; see Happé & Frith,
1995, for review). The autistic child will most likely say that when Maxi returns, he will
look in location y, despite the fact that Maxi never witnessed the transfer.
Theory of Mind and Verbal Ability
The potentially critical influence of language and communication skills in general
on theory of mind understanding is suggested by these findings and the fact that
performance on false belief tasks is related to verbal ability in normally-developing
preschoolers. For example, Jenkins and Astington (1996) investigated the role of verbal
memory, nonverbal memory, and verbal ability in the development of theory of mind
using normally-developing 3- to 5-year-olds. Performance on both a sentence memory
task and an expressive language assessment was correlated with false belief
understanding, while performance on the nonverbal memory assessment was not.
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Auditory language comprehension has also been found to be related to false belief task
performance in preschoolers (Watson, Nixon, Wilson, & Capage, 1999)
The possibility that verbal skills are related to false belief task performance has
also been examined extensively in autistic populations. Happé (1995) found that all
autistic individuals with a verbal mental age (VMA) below 5-6 fail theory of mind tasks
and all participants with a verbal mental age above an upper threshold of 7-11 pass theory
of mind tasks (see also Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991; Leslie & Frith, 1988, and Prior,
Dahlstrom, & Squires, 1990). Verbal ability in these studies has been measured by the
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Dunn & Dunn, 1981) and the verbal subscales of
standardized tests like the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-III (Weschler, 1991).
Similarly, Yimiya, Slomonica-Levi, Shulman, and Pilowky (1996) attempted to
disentangle the effects of chronological age (CA), VMA and performance mental age
(PMA) in typically developing, mentally retarded, and autistic children. They were able
to match participants on both VMA and PMA. Their results showed that VMA and CA
significantly predicted the number of tasks passed by autistic individuals, while PMA did
not. Sparrevohn and Howie (1995) also gave autistic participants a performance scale
along with verbal and theory of mind tasks. Similar to previous findings, the low verbal
ability participants failed a greater number of tasks than the high verbal ability group
regardless of performance abilities.
Yet, some autistic adults with high verbal IQ’s never acquire a theory of mind
(Baron-Cohen, 1989; Sigman, et. al., 1995). Advanced verbal abilities may be necessary,
but not sufficient, to develop a theory of mind or compensate for other areas in which the
autistic child is impaired. This discrepancy has led researchers to evaluate the role of
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other aspects of cognitive functioning in theory of mind understanding. Specifically, it
has been postulated that in addition to verbal ability, a certain level of executive
functioning may also be necessary for theory of mind development and may also account
for theory of mind deficits in autism.
Executive Functions
Conceptualizations of executive function are controversial (see Hughes, 1998a,
Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997, and Lyon & Krasnegor, 1996, for discussions
related to developmental issues). According to Barkley (1997), executive functions are
defined as “those types of actions we perform to ourselves and direct at ourselves so as to
accomplish self-control, goal-directed behavior, and the maximization of future
outcomes” (p. 57). In other words, executive function is self-directed behavior used in
the storage and manipulation of information. Therefore, executive function deficits can
generally be described as unsuccessful complex problem-solving involving response
perseveration, an inability to inhibit responses, and difficulty actively manipulating
information in an accessible and flexible way. “Without sufficient guidance from
working memory, the result is the disproportionate control of behavior by environmental
stimuli, and preexisting response tendencies” (p. 191, Kimberg, D’Eposito, & Farah,
1998).
Most models of executive functions include both verbal and nonverbal
components (e.g., the phonological loop and visuospatial sketchpad in Baddeley’s (1986)
model of working memory). Nonverbal working memory holds nonverbal information
like events and behaviors in mind and then acts on these events. Verbal working memory
holds verbal information in mind using self-speech and allows the individual to use the
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data for other tasks, and includes the effects of direct instruction and behavior contingent
on rules (Barkley, 1997). Nonverbal working memory may be developmentally more
primitive than verbal working memory. One study by Conrad (1971) found that children
below the age of 5 rely more on visual codes to remember pictures rather than verbal
information. In contrast, behavior contingent on rules uses verbal working memory and
behavioral inhibition to prevent the unwanted behavior and comply with the rule. By the
end of three years, rules become substantially more effective in controlling children’s
behavior (Barkley, 1997).
There have been a variety of actual tasks that have been called executive function
tasks. In the Wisconsin Card Sort Task (WCST, Grant & Berg, 1948), the participant is
asked to sort cards according to a specific rule such as color, shape, or number of objects
on the card. During the task, the sorting rule is changed without the participant’s
knowledge. Participants must inhibit the prepotent response (behavior inhibition), follow
a new rule (verbal working memory), maintain self-awareness and hindsight (nonverbal
working memory), stay persistent and motivated (self-regulation) and have response
flexibility (reconstitution) (Barkley, 1997). All these functions work together to control
the motor response of where to place each card. Backward digit span (BDS) is another
common task used to measure the capacity of short term working memory, based on a
model similar to Baddeley’s (e.g., Davis & Pratt, 1995). BDS requires the individual to
hold numbers in working memory and then manipulate these numbers in order to recall
them in reverse order. The participant is also required to inhibit a prepotent response
(repeating the numbers in the order they were presented), use self-regulation and respond
flexibly.
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It has been suggested that the primary deficit in autism is related to executive
function (Hughes, 1996; Hughes & Russell, 1993; Ozonoff, 1995), although, given
differences between the behavior of individuals with autism and individuals with
prefrontal cortex lesions (who also show executive function deficits), executive
dysfunction may be a necessary but not sufficient problem in the development of autism
(Ozonoff, 1995). For example, Cieselski and Harris (1997) tested autistic participants on
five executive function measures. Performance of the participants on these tests was
independent of general intelligence (as measured by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale and Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children) and was significantly impaired
compared to a control group. Errors on the task were characterized as being primarily
due to perseveration and difficulty disengaging from irrelevant aspects of the stimuli.
This was particularly evident on the tasks with the most loosely defined rules and
complex problem-solving (cf. Rumsey & Hamburger, 1988).
Theory of Mind and Executive Function
From these descriptions of executive functioning it is possible to describe how
well-developed executive functioning, particularly with respect to verbal information,
may be necessary for developing a theory of mind. For example, the false belief task
places the participant in a condition where his or her knowledge conflicts with someone
else’s knowledge. In order to answer what the other would say, the participant must
“disengage” from what he or she knows of the object’s true location. For those children
who cannot disengage, reality is based on their current belief. This is particularly
important when the participant’s desire differs from that of the character. For example,
Moore, Jarrold, Russell, Lumb, Sapp, and MacCallum (1995) examined the role of
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conflicting desire in false belief task performance. Three- to 5-year-old children were
asked to choose one of two animal stickers they would take home in return for doing the
study. Then they were told a story about another child who was scared of the particular
animal on the sticker they chose. The participant was then asked which sticker he or she
thought the story character would choose. Children who were not able to disengage from
their own desire picked the same sticker they would like for the story character even
though the character was frightened by the sticker.
Similarly, tasks that entail strategic deception have been proposed to assess theory
of mind as well as inherently entailing aspects of executive function (Russell, Jarrold, &
Potel, 1994; although see Samuels, Brooks and Frye, 1996, for an alternative
interpretation). The “windows task” has been used to assess strategic deception, and is
based on Woodruff and Premack’s (1979) deception paradigm with chimpanzees. In the
task, the participant sits across a table from an opponent. An experimenter has both
“players” close their eyes and hides a treat inside one of two opaque boxes placed on the
table. The participant is then instructed to point to one of the boxes for the opponent to
open. If it is the box with the treat, the opponent gets it. If it is the empty box, the
participant gets to open the other one and get the treat. A number of these trials are
presented so that the participant learns that the box he or she does not point to will be the
one he or she gets to open.
In the test phase, different boxes are used that have windows on the side that faces
the participant (i.e., the opponent still cannot see what they contain). Pointing to the
empty box will ensure that the participant always gets the treat. Four-year-olds point to
the empty box on the first test trial. Typically-developing three-year-olds, autistic
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participants, and non-human primates not only point to the baited box on the first test
trial, they continue to point at it on all subsequent trials even though this means they
never get the treat. This indicates an inability to disengage from a salient stimulus,
inhibit a prepotent response, and behave strategically.
This task continues to be difficult under variations where there is no opponent
(hence, no possibility of behaving so as to create a “false belief” in the other), and when
the children know where the treat is even if they cannot see it (Russell, et al., 1994). In
addition, it is also the case that in one study performance on the windows task was not
correlated with performance on standard false belief tasks (Samuels, Brooks, & Frye,
1996). However, similarities between aspects of theory of mind understanding and
executive functioning have been examined more directly, and provide some additional
support for linking the two.
Frye, Zelazo, and Palfai (1995) investigated relations between preschoolers’
performance on standard theory of mind tasks and a card sorting task. More
perseveration errors on the sorting task (which involved a complex embedded rule
structure like the WCST) were related to less well-developed false belief reasoning. In
another study, Gordon and Olson (1998) had participants do two completely independent
tasks at one time (the dual-task paradigm based on Baddeley’s model of working memory
and executive function (1981)). Children who succeeded on these tasks also did well on
the false belief tasks (r = .64). Davis and Pratt (1995) found that performance on a
backward digit span executive function task was related to theory of mind understanding.
Hughes (1998b) has conducted the most extensive study in this area, looking at
both concurrent and longitudinal relations between executive functioning and theory of
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mind. She used tasks that were particularly well-designed with respect to their age
appropriateness, for example, the Tower of Hanoi test of executive function was replaced
by the Tower of London test (Shallice, 1982, cited in Hughes, 1998b), which reduces
demands on cognitive abilities that are not directly related to executive function (like
visuomotor coordination and short-term memory). Hughes found significant correlations
between the executive function tasks and false belief understanding at both times of
measurement (at time 1, the children were approximately 4 years of age, and were one
year older at time 2), and predictive relations between executive functioning at time one
and theory of mind at time 2. Interestingly, she did not find predictive relations between
false belief task performance at time 1 and executive function at time 2, suggesting that
relations between these two types of skills are not caused by a third underlying variable.
Rather, the data provide fairly strong support for the idea that executive functioning is a
critical factor in false belief understanding but not vice versa. Finally, while age and
verbal ability were related to performance on many of the tasks, the majority of the
relations she observed between executive function and theory of mind remained
significant after age and vocabulary skills were partialled out.
Other studies have specifically demonstrated relations between performance of
individuals with autism on executive function and theory of mind understanding (e.g.,
Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996; Hughes & Russel, 1993). Ozonoff, Pennington, and
Roberts (1991) compared a group of high-functioning autistic individuals to a control
group matched on verbal IQ and CA. All the participants were given a series of tasks
measuring theory of mind, including the second-order belief attribution task (town),
executive function tasks (Tower of Hanoi and WCST), an emotion perception task, a
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verbal memory task, and a visuospatial ability task. Performance on the executive
function and second-order theory of mind tasks was lower for the autistic group than the
control compared to any of the other tasks. Questions still remain, however, concerning
this issue.
Present Study
In order to continue investigating relations between theory of mind understanding
and executive function, the present study expanded the populations in which these
relations have been investigated to elementary school children. As mentioned previously,
the majority of work on theory of mind has been done with preschoolers, but
understanding in this area continues to grow, and tasks have been developed to tap more
sophisticated reasoning in this domain. First, traditional false belief tasks are “firstorder” tasks because they concern one person thinking about another’s behavior.
However, a critical feature of representational cognition is that it is recursive, and
second- and higher-order variations on the original false belief task are possible – he can
think about what she is thinking about, not just about what she is doing. The ability to
make second-order belief attributions may be a more sensitive measure of theory of mind
ability at older ages or higher levels of competence (see also Baron-Cohen, 1989,
Ozonoff et al., 1991, and Sparrevohn & Howie, 1989). Two second-order theory of mind
tasks appropriate for use with children ages 5 to 10, a 3-dimensional “town” and a
recursive thinking task, were used in the present study. In addition, presenting false
belief tasks entirely verbally may also yield some insight into how verbal ability and the
verbal working memory aspect of executive functioning are related to theory of mind
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development. Therefore, the town task was also presented in an auditory form, without
using 3-dimensional props.
With this older age group, the present study aims to examine relations between
verbal abilities, executive function, and theory of mind. Backward digit span was used as
the measure of executive function. The Test of Auditory Language ComprehensionRevised (TACL-R) provides a very comprehensive measure of verbal auditory memory
skills and assesses children’s general language comprehension abilities. Two other
measures of verbal auditory memory skills that have been utilized in past research were
also included. To assess the relationship between verbal working memory and theory of
mind performance, auditory sentence memory and forward digit span were given.
Finally, Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices was used to examine additional verbal
and nonverbal skills involved in problem-solving ability (Kleuver, 1995).
In order to provide support for the idea that the links between executive function,
verbal ability and theory of mind are not due to development in general intelligence or
chronological age, it is important to examine other skills that are not highly related to
executive functioning or theory of mind performance, but are related to general
intelligence. The processing speed index of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for ChildrenIII (WISC-III) composed of the Coding and Symbol Search subtests is the index with the
lowest correlation with the verbal IQ score (.43), but is correlated with the full scale IQ
score or general IQ on the WISC-III (.60; Wechsler, 1991, pp. 270-274) and thus was
chosen as a potential non-correlate with executive functioning and theory of mind
performance. The two tasks that make up the processing speed index are thought to
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assess aspects of visual attention and concentration and do not involve response
perseveration or inhibition, or other aspects of working memory.
Thus, it was hypothesized that the assessments of verbal ability and executive
function would be related to performance on the theory of mind tasks, while processing
speed would not be related or would be significantly less related to performance on the
theory of mind task. The degree to which the measures of executive functioning and the
different assessments of verbal ability account for both overlapping and unique variance
in the theory of mind measures also was assessed.
Method
Participants
Participants in the study were 63 elementary school children between the ages of
5 and 10 years (M = 88.79 months, SD = 14.40, Range = 65 to 119 months). The
children were predominantly Caucasian and middle-class and attended a local elementary
school in Morgantown, WV. A letter providing a description of the study and a request
for participation was sent to all the teachers at the school. Over 400 letters were sent
home to the families of all children in kindergarten through third grade in the
participating school asking the parents for permission to have their children participate in
the study. All 63 children whose parents returned the permission form took part in the
study.
Measures of Cognitive Abilities
Backward digit span. As the measure of executive function, children
listened to a series of numbers of increasing length and then were asked to recall the
numbers in the reverse order of presentation. Scores on the backward digit span (BDS)
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are said to represent the ability to hear the sound of the digits presented in a forward
manner, maintain the digits in memory, and then reorganize and manipulate the digits in
order to repeat them in reverse sequence. (Backward and forward digit span [see below]
form the auditory number memory subscale of the Test of Auditory-Perceptual Skills
[TAPS]), but were kept separate for the analyses conducted here.) Depending on age,
reliability coefficients for internal consistency range from .56 to .77 (Gardner, 1985). As
stated by Gardner (1985) content and item validity were found to be sufficient for all six
subtests of the TAPS. Correlations between performance of the TAPS and other
measures that tap auditory-perceptual skills (e.g., Expressive One-Word Picture
Vocabulary Test and the vocabulary subtests of the WISC-III) range from .17 to .56, and
indicate that the TAPS does assess aspects of the measured behaviors while also showing
unique variance in auditory perception (Gardner, 1985).
Auditory Language Comprehension. As a measure of verbal ability, three scales
of the Test for the Auditory Comprehension of Language-Revised (TACL-R; CarrowWoolfolk, 1985) were used to assess children’s general language competence: (1) Word
Classes and Relations: assesses word meaning and word relations, (2) Morphology:
assesses meaning of grammatical morphemes, (3) Sentences: assesses meaning of
elaborated sentence constructions. The test was administered according to the procedures
in the TACL-R Examiner’s Manual (Carrow-Woolfolk, 1985). Each child was presented
with a series of three pictures and a verbal prompt, such as a word, phrase, or sentence.
The child was then asked to point to the picture that was best described by the utterance.
The split-half reliability has been reported to range from .88 to .97 for the total score
(Sattler, 1992). As stated by Sattler (1992), the TACL-R appears to have satisfactory
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content validity indicated by an extensive theoretical and logical analysis of language
skill development and satisfactory concurrent validity, as shown by significant
correlations with similar tests ranging from .37 to .76 (e.g., Peabody Picture Vocabulary
Test and the Sequenced Inventory of Communication Development). The raw scores for
each of the scales were calculated and converted to standardized scores to account for age
differences.
Auditory Sentence Memory. As another measure of verbal ability, this subtest of
the TAPS measures ability to recall sentence information by rote memory and correct
sequence. Children are read sentences of increasing grammatical complexity and length.
Scoring is based on word omission, distortion, substitution, and sequencing error. No
reliability was reported for this subtest in the TAPS manual. See backward digit span
above for validity of total scores on the TAPS.
Forward digit span. As another measure of verbal ability, children listened to a
series of numbers of increasing length and there were asked to recall the numbers in
order. In the forward digit span (FDS) test, children were asked to recall the numbers in
the same order they heard them. Scores on the FDS are said to measure aspects of rote
memory ability and retention of comprehended auditory matter. The reliability
coefficients for internal consistency range from .81 to .86 depending on the age of the
participant (Gardner, 1985). See backward digit span above for validity of total scores on
the TAPS.
Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices. As a measure of both verbal, noverbal,
and general intelligence, the Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices measures both verbal
and nonverbal problem-solving abilities and general intelligence by asking children to
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match designs to matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1995). In order to match the
matrices, the child may use self-talk to find the piece to fill the matrix. Therefore, it is
likely that this task measures verbal working memory as well. There are three different
versions of the matrices, the Standard Progressive Matrices, the Advanced Progressive
Matrices, and the Colored Progressive Matrices. The Colored Progressive Matrices is the
most appropriate for the age range of children who participated in the present study (ages
5 – 10), and has been shown to have test-retest reliability of approximately .90 across all
age groups. The Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices has been found to be
significantly related to subtest scores and IQs from the WISC-III and significant
correlations with the Johnson Test of Achievement-Revised (Kluever, 1995). The colored
matrix problems were presented to the children in book form.
Processing Speed. As a measure of general intelligence that is less related to
verbal ability than general intelligence, two subtests, Symbol Search and Coding, of the
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-III (Weschler, 1991) measured speed of
processing. Symbol Search has each child scan through 3 to 5 symbols and determine if
any two of the series are the same. Coding requires the child to match a series of
symbols with a corresponding number or shape. Each child is given two minutes to
complete as many problems as they can. Depending on the age of the participant, testretest reliability coefficients range from .69 to .90 for the two subtests, and .80 to .91 for
the processing speed factor (Wechsler, 1991).
Measures of Theory of Mind
Town task A 3-dimensional “town” was constructed using Legos adapted from
a task used by Perner and Wimmer (1985) to examine children’s understanding of second
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order beliefs (see Appendix A). The town was made up of two houses, a church, a
school, a park, a playground, a road, four ‘playpeople,’ and an ice-cream van. The entire
town fit on a tabletop and could easily be taken apart and reassembled.
The children were told a story that involved two characters named John and Mary.
They are in the park when they see an ice cream man. Mary would like to buy an ice
cream, but she left her money at home. The ice-cream man says she can get her money
and buy some ice cream later, because he will be in the park all afternoon. Mary goes
home and John is at the park on his own when he sees the ice cream man leaving the
park. John asks the ice cream man where he is going and the man says that he is going to
the church. The ice cream man heads down the road towards the church and Mary sees
the ice cream man through a window at her house. She asks him where he is going and
finds out that he is heading to the church. John goes home to do some homework. Later,
he goes over to Mary’s house for some help on his homework only to find that she has
gone to get an ice cream. After hearing the story, each child is asked a test question,
“Where does John think Mary has gone?” a justification question, “Why does he think
she has gone to the _____?” and three control questions, “Does Mary know that the ice
cream van is at the church? Does John know that the ice cream man has talked to Mary?
Where did Mary go for her ice cream?” To pass this task and receive 2 points, a child
must correctly answer both the test question and the justification question. A correct
justification can contain a nesting of epistemic states (e.g., because he does not know that
she already knows where the van is), information nested within a belief (e.g., because he
does not know that she had talked to the ice-cream man), or refer to the initial location of
the ice cream van (e.g., because she said she would go to the park to get ice cream in the

18

afternoon). If the child answered the test question correctly, but failed to answer the
justification question correctly, he or she only received 1 point. Finally, if the test
question was answered incorrectly (the justification would be insignificant if the test
question was wrong), then the child received no points. Three control questions were
used to ensure that the child understood the story and no points were given for correct
answers. For example, “Does Mary know that the ice-cream van is at the church?”
Therefore, a range of 0 to 2 total points was possible for the Town task.
Auditory town task The children received one story that paralleled the “ice cream
story” used in the Town task described above (see Appendix B). The character names
and the situations were changed (e.g., Jenny and Eric are at the zoo and Jenny wants to
buy some lemonade). Rather than enacting the story using dolls, legos, or other props,
this story was told entirely verbally. The Auditory town task was scored the same way as
the Town task with a total of 2 possible points.
Recursive thinking task This task was adapted from Openheimer (1986) and
Miller, Kessel, and Flavell (1970). During this task, the participants were shown a series
of cartoon people and thought bubbles, to examine the child’s ability to reason about
embedded thoughts. First, the children were introduced to the four characters (father,
mother, boy, and girl) and the concepts of thought bubbles and talking bubbles. When
the child could correctly name both the characters and the bubbles, the Recursive
thinking task was given (see Appendix C).
There were 18 cards that depicted four different types of thinking: (1) contiguity,
an individual thinking about him or herself or others, (2) action, thinking about
individuals participating in actions, (3) one-loop recursion, thinking about someone else’s
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thoughts, and (4) two-loop recursion, thinking about someone else who is thinking about
someone else. There were six cards depicting contiguity, three of action, five of one-loop
recursion, and four of two-loop recursion. All 18 cards were randomly scattered on the
table facing up and towards the child. Then he or she was asked to point to the card
which described one of the thought processes (e.g., Point to the card of the boy thinking
about the girl thinking about the father?). If the child pointed to the correct card, he or
she received 1 point, making a total of 18 points possible. All of the cards remained on
the table throughout the 18 items.
Procedure
The data were collected as part of a larger study on attentional processes and
theory of mind development in school children. Each participating child was brought out
of the classroom for two to three sessions ranging from fifteen to twenty-five-minutes to
receive the Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1995), Test
of Auditory Comprehension of Language-Revised (Carrow-Woolfolk, 1985), Symbol
Search and Coding subtests of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-III
(Wechsler, 1991), Test of Auditory-Perceptual Skills (which included auditory sentence
memory and forward and backward digit span; Gardner, 1985) and the various theory of
mind measures as well as other tasks required for the larger study. The testing occurred
in a small conference room in the school office to allow for maximum privacy. Two
graduate and two undergraduate students were trained in task administration by a doctoral
student who had experience doing assessments and all five students conducted the
testing. Each participant was tested by one or more testers and received all of the tests in
random order with the exception of the Auditory town task which was added later in the
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study after all participants had already received the Town task. The potential of practice
effects resulting in increased scores on the Auditory town was assessed.
Results
Data for each measure was first examined descriptively for distributions and
univariate outliers. Next, partial correlations for all of the cognitive ability variables and
the theory of mind measures controlling for age were examined separately. Then, partial
correlations between the cognitive ability variables and the theory of mind measures
controlling for age were examined. Finally, multiple regression analyses were conducted
to assess shared and unique variance in predicting the theory of mind measures from any
cognitive correlates that demonstrated explanatory power (i.e., were significantly
correlated to the theory of mind measures at the zero-order level).
To determine whether differences existed between boys and girls, t-tests
comparing the performance of boys and girls for each measure were conducted. No
gender differences were found. Therefore, all subsequent analyses were collapsed across
gender.
Descriptive Analyses
Table 1 shows the mean, standard deviation, and range of each of the variables in
the present study. These data were examined for their distributions and for any univariate
and bivariate outliers. All variables met acceptable criteria for inclusion in further
analyses. Three children were missing data on the Town task and Auditory town task and
nine children were missing processing speed data, because they no longer could
participate in the study. Missing data points for the town tasks were replaced with the
mean across participants. However, because there was a large number of participants
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missing data for processing speed, analyses involving processing speed utilized only the
52 children with complete data. One individual consistently scored lower than the other
participants on all tasks. Initial correlations including this participant were compared to
correlations that excluded the individual and no significant differences were found.
Therefore, analyses reported include this participant.
Correlations between Age and Cognitive and Theory of Mind Variables
Correlations were obtained between age and the raw scores of the cognitive
variables (processing speed, problem-solving, auditory language comprehension, auditory
sentence memory, and forward and backward digit span) and the theory of mind variables
(Town task, Auditory town task, and Recursive thinking task) (see Table 2). Age was
significantly and positively associated with all of the raw scores of the cognitive variables
except for processing speed (sum of Coding and Symbol Search subtests of WISC-III).
Age was also significantly and positively correlated with the three theory of mind
measures.
Partial Correlations of Cognitive Measures
Partial correlations controlling for age were computed for the raw scores of
processing speed (sum of the Coding and Symbol Search subtests of the WISC-III),
problem-solving ability, auditory language comprehension, auditory sentence memory,
forward digit span, and backward digit span (see Table 3). Better auditory language
comprehension was associated with higher scores on processing speed, problem solving,
sentence memory, and backward digit span. Higher scores on backward digit span were
associated with problem-solving ability in contrast to scores on forward digit span that
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were not related to problem-solving. Intercorrelations between all four verbal measures
were positive, however one did not meet significance.
Relatedness and Difficulty of Theory of Mind Tasks
Partial correlations for the three theory of mind tasks controlling for age were
obtained (see Table 4). Better scores on the Town task were associated with high scores
on the Auditory town task. Scores on the Recursive thinking task were not related to
either of the town tasks. A t-test showed that the Town task (mean = .88) was not
significantly harder than the Auditory town task (mean = .97) (t = .61, p<.54) and
therefore the possibility that practice effects significantly elevated scores on the Auditory
town task is unlikely.
Partial Correlations of the Cognitive and Theory of Mind Measures Controlling for Age
As shown in Table 5, correlations were conducted between each of the cognitive
measures (processing speed, problem-solving, auditory language comprehension,
auditory sentence memory, forward digit span, and backward digit span) and theory of
mind tasks (Town task, Auditory town task, and Recursive thinking task) controlling for
age. High scores on the Town task were associated lower scores on processing speed, but
not related to scores on any of the other cognitive measures. The Auditory town task was
also not related to any of the cognitive measures. Better scores on the Recursive thinking
task were associated with better problem-solving, language comprehension, sentence
memory, and backward digit span, but not related to scores on forward digit span or
processing speed.
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Regression Analysis
One regression analysis was conducted to determine the amount of independent
variance in performance on the Recursive thinking task that was explained by only those
cognitive variables with which it was significantly correlated: problem-solving ability,
auditory language comprehension, auditory sentence memory, and backward digit span.
Age was entered on the first step, and accounted for 18.5% of the variance in
performance on the Recursive thinking task (F (1, 56) = 12.48. p < .00). Problem-solving
ability, auditory language comprehension, auditory sentence memory and forward and
backward digit span were entered together on the second step, and the final regression
equation accounted for 64.0% of the variance in performance on the Recursive thinking
task (F (5, 56) = 18.17, p < .00). Only the beta weight for auditory language
comprehension (.73, p < .00) was significant in the final equation.
Discussion
The present study investigated the role of verbal ability, processing speed, and
executive function in children’s theory of mind understanding. Past research has focused
on preschoolers, during the time when false belief understanding begins to emerge. This
study utilized tasks appropriate for elementary school children and measured more
advanced forms of theory of mind involving recursive, second- and higher-order
processes. The results of this study indicated that verbal ability and executive function
continue to be important skills for theory of mind development as children reach more
advanced levels of theory of mind performance. This finding is bolstered by the fact that
another important measure of cognitive ability, processing speed, was not predictive of
theory of mind functioning.
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Age was significantly correlated with performance on all three theory of mind
tasks. These findings confirm the developmental progression of theory of mind
understanding throughout elementary school. Rather than being a concept that is
acquired around age four when children usually gain false belief understanding, theory of
mind development appears to continue to grow past the preschool years.
Past studies have found language ability was related to performance on theory of
mind tasks in typically-developing preschoolers and children with autism. This research
has utilized a variety of measures of language. The present study included two measures
used in past research, auditory sentence memory and forward digit span, and two new
measures, TACL-R and Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices. Auditory language
comprehension as measured by the TACL-R was the only language measure that was
positively and significantly related to performance on all three measures of theory of
mind. Furthermore, in the regression analysis, TACL-R, in addition to age, was the only
significant predictor of performance on the Recursive thinking task. Other research has
found relationships between executive functioning and theory of mind after controlling
for language skills as measured by vocabulary tests. This study was the first to include
multiple assessments of complex verbal skills, including verbal auditory memory and
comprehension of grammatical morphemes and elaborated sentence constructions. The
only measure of verbal skills that was less correlated with theory of mind than the
measure of executive function, BDS was FDS. This finding is similar to the results Davis
and Pratt (1995) found with 3- to 5-year olds. Davis and Pratt’s study revealed that
backward digit span significantly predicted performance on a false belief task and a false
photograph task, but forward digit span did not. The results of both the Davis and Pratt
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study and the present study add to the increasing evidence in support that verbal working
memory is important in predicting theory of mind performance. The amount of
information (i.e., the number of digits) that the child can hold and manipulate in verbal
working memory (recall in reverse order) while inhibiting the prepotent response (recall
in the same order as presented) is significantly related to theory of mind performance.
Unlike backward digit span, forward digit span only requires the participant to hold the
numbers in same order as they were presented and then recall them with no manipulation
required. The present study, therefore, suggests complex relations between the various
measures of verbal ability, the BDS task, and the theory of mind tasks.
A limitation of the present study is that a vocabulary test like the Test of Early
Language Development (Hresko, Reid, & Hammill, 1981) or the Peabody Picture
Vocabulary Test (Dunn & Dunn, 1981) was not included to compare results with
previous studies and examine the relationship between vocabulary tests, complex verbal
skills as measured by the TACL, executive functioning, and performance on theory of
mind tasks. In addition, the sample consisted of children from predominantly white,
middle class families. Many of the children who participated were also involved in gifted
programs or had been diagnosed with Attention-Deficit Disorder.
Future research with elementary school children should use other measures of
executive function that have been used previously with preschoolers and children with
autism, such as a Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Frye, Zelazo, and Palfai, 1995) or the
“windows task” (Russell, et al., 1994), in order to further investigate relations between
complex verbal comprehension skills and executive function in predicting theory of mind
developmet. In addition, different measures of advanced forms of theory of mind should
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be utilized. It is important to determine the similarities and differences between the
various executive functioning tasks, verbal tasks, and theory of mind. In addition, studies
of other populations with different social and cultural backgrounds using these types of
tasks have been largely overlooked. Varying qualities of social interaction, exposure to
mentalistic concepts and use of executive functioning may play a large role in theory of
mind development.
As stated by Hughes (1998a), children’s theories of mind are multifaceted
constructs, and involve several distinct types of skill. Individual children most likely
develop an understanding of mental states by way of different pathways involving
various precursors. Frith, Morton, and Leslie (1991) have also hypothesized that theory
of mind acquisition most likely occurs via multiple pathways, through their work with the
autistic population. The present study supports that throughout elementary school,
typically developing children continue to gain theory of mind understanding with
advances in both verbal ability and executive functioning.
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Table 1
Mean, Standard Deviation, and Range for all Variables

Variables
M
SD
Range
________________________________________________________________________
Processing speed

21.79

5.51

12.00 – 36.00

Problem-solving

22.35

6.59

8.00 – 35.00

Auditory language comprehension

101.79

12.10

66.00 – 120.00

Auditory sentence memory

4.74

1.52

1.00 – 7.00

Forward digit span

26.82

11.22

4.00 –62.00

Backward digit span

9.79

4.91

.00 – 28.00

Town task

.88

.95

.00 – 2.00

Auditory town task

.97

.93

.00 – 2.00

Recursive thinking task

10.25

4.30

2.00 – 18.00
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Table 2
Correlations between Age and the Cognitive and Theory of Mind Variables

Age

Cognitive Variables
Processing speed

.094

Problem-solving

.57**

Auditory language comprehension

.62**

Auditory sentence memory

.43**

Forward digit span

.36**

Backward digit span

.43**

Theory of Mind Variables
Town task

.30*

Auditory town task

.28*

Recursive thinking task
.44**
________________________________________________________________________
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
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Table 3
Partial Correlations of Cognitive Measures Controlling for Age

1

2

3

4

5

1. Processing speed
2. Problem-solving

.31*

3. Language comp.

.30*

.54**

4. Sentence mem.

-.079

.27*

.29*

5. FDS

-.14

.061

.15

.54**

6. BDS
-.022
.34**
.32**
.47**
.29*
________________________________________________________________________
*p < .05, one-tailed.
**p < .01, one-tailed.
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Table 4
Partial Correlations of Theory of Mind Measures Controlling for Age

1

2

1. Town task
2. Auditory town task

.29**

3. Recursive thinking task
.10
.17
________________________________________________________________________
*p < .01, one-tailed.
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Table 5
Partial Correlations for Cognitive and Theory of Mind Measures Controlling for Age

Town

Auditory
town

Recursive
thinking

1. Processing speed

-.33*

-.075

.089

2. Problem-solving

.19

-.054

.48**

3. Language comprehension .11

.12

.69**

4. Sentence memory

-.090

-.17

.34*

5. Forward digit span

.048

-.081

.14

6. Backward digit span
.095
-.092
.31
________________________________________________________________________
*p < .05, one-tailed.
**p < .01, one-tailed.
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Table 6
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis of Variables Predicting Performance on
Recursive Thinking Task

Independent Variable
B
SE B
Beta
Final R2
________________________________________________________________________
Step 1
Age

.13

.037

.43**

Problem-solving

.067

.099

.062

Language comprehension

.26

.048

.73**

Sentence memory

.47

.39

.13

Step 2

Backward digit span
.011
.10
.012
.64
________________________________________________________________________
**p < .01.
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Appendix A
Town task
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Subject #

DOB

Date

Tester

Score

False Belief Version of Ice Cream Story
Introduction
This is a story about John and Mary who live in this village. This morning John and Mary are together in the
park. In the park there is also an ice-cream man in his van.
Episode 1
Mary would like to buy an ice cream cone but she left her money at home. So she is very sad. “Don’t be sad,”
says the ice-cream man, “you can fetch your money and buy some ice cream later. I’ll be here in the park all
afternoon.” “Oh good,” says Mary, I ' l l be back in the afternoon to buy some ice cream. I'll make sure I won’t forget
my money then.”
Episode 2
So Mary goes home.... She lives in this house. She goes inside the house. Now John is on his own in the park.
To his surprise he sees the ice-cream man leaving the park in his van. ‘Where are you going?” asks John. The icecream man says “I’m going to drive my van to the church. There is no one in the park to buy ice-cream; so perhaps I
can sell some outside the church.”
Episode 3
The ice-cream man drives over to the church. On his way he passes Mary’s house. Mary is looking out the
window and spots the van. ‘Where are you going?" she asks. “I’m going to the church. I'll be able to sell more ice
cream there,” answers the man. “It’s a good thing that I saw you.” says Mary. Now John doesn’t know that Mary
talked to the ice-cream man. He doesn’t know that!
Episode 4
Now John has to go home. After lunch he is doing his homework. He can’t do one of the tasks. So he goes over
to Mary’s house to ask for help. Mary’s mother answers the door. “Is Mary in?” asks John. “Oh,” says Mary’s
mother, “She lust left. She said she was going to get an ice cream cone.”
Test Question
So John runs to look for Mary. Where does he think she has gone?

Justification question
Why does he think she has gone to the

1.

?

If correct = 3 POINTS, continue with disappear story; If incorrect = 0 POINTS, continue with Memory aid and
Prompt story
Control Questions
Does Mary know that the ice-cream van is at the church?

2.

Does John know that the ice-cream man has talked to Mary?

3.

Where did Mary go for her ice cream?
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Subject #

Tester

Score
False Belief Music Story
(auditory story, no visuals)

This is a story about Robbie and Kate. It is a Saturday afternoon and Robbie and Kate are at the
mall listening to a band playing music.
Scene 1 (Robbie and Kate are at the mall listening. to a band)
Robbie wants to play with them, but he has left his guitar at home. He is very upset. “Don’t be
upset” says the bandleader. “You can get your guitar and play with us later, because we will be
here at the mall all afternoon.” “Oh good,” says Robbie “I’ll
. be back later to play with you, and
I’ll be sure not to forget my guitar.”
Scene 2 (Robbie at home, Kate at the mall)
So Robbie goes home. Now Kate is at the mall by herself. To her surprise, she sees the band
leaving the mall with their instruments. “Where are you going?” she asks. The bandleader says,
“We’re going to go to a restaurant. There is no one here at the mall to listen to us, so maybe we
can play for the people in the restaurant.”
Scene 3 (The band drives past Robbie’s house on the way to the restaurant)
The band is driving to the restaurant when they pass Robbie’s house. Robbie is looking out of
the window and sees the band in their van. He runs outside. “Where are you going?” he asks.
“We’re going to the restaurant. We will be able to play for more people there,” answers the
bandleader . “It’s a good thing I saw you,” says Robbie. However, Kate does not know that
Robbie talked to the bandleader. She doesn’t know that!!
Scen e4 (Robbie and Kate’s houses]
It is a little later, and Kate goes home to make lunch. She is out of bread, so she walks to
Robbie’s house to ask if she can borrow some. Robbie’s mother answers the door. “Is Robbie
home?” asks Kate. “Oh,” says Robbie’s mother, “He just left. He said he was going to play his
guitar with the band.”
TEST QUESTION
Kate runs to look for Robbie. Where does she think he has gone?

JUSTIFICATION QUESTION
Why does she think he has gone to the

?

CONTROL QUESTIONS
1. Does Robbie know that the band is at the restaurant?
2. Does Kate know that the bandleader has talked to Robbie?
3. Where did Robbie go to play with the band?
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RECURSIVE THINKING PROMPTS

Contiguity:
1
2
3
4
5
6

The boy is thinking of the girl
The boy is thinking of himself
The boy is thinking of the girl and father
The boy is thinking of himself and the girl
The boy is thinking of the girl, father, and mother
The boy is thinking of himself, the girl, and father

Action:
7
8
9

The boy is thinking that the girl is talking to father
The boy is thinking that he is talking to the girl
The boy is thinking that the girl is talking to him

One-loop Recursion:
10
11
12
13
14

The
The
The
The
The

boy is thinking that the girl is thinking of father
boy is thinking that he is thinking of the girl
boy is thinking that the girl is thinking of him
boy is thinking that the girl is thinking of herself
boy is thinking that he is thinking of himself

Two-loop Recursion:
15
16
17
18

The boy is thinking that the girl is thinking of the father
thinking of mother
The boy is thinking that he is thinking of the girl
thinking of herself
The boy is thinking that the girls is thinking of him
thinking of her
The boy is thinking that he is thinking of himself thinking
of himself
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RECURSIVE THINKING PICTURES

CONTIGUITY

ACTION

ONE-LOOP RECURSION

TWO-LOOP RECURSION
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